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Unlike many other mergers in developed countries, which might have been assessed and 
their effects estimated by antitrust authorities before being granted antitrust immunity, the 
airline mergers that swept China‘s airline industry in 2002 occurred with no antitrust 
challenge. These mergers provide the opportunity to study important market power issues in 
China‘s airline markets. Given that increased concentration and multimarket contact are the 
main legacies of an airline merger, the effects of mergers on these variables can raise the 
potential for the exercise of market power. However, an examination of the period 2002-2004 
during which the Chinese airline mergers occurred shows that the resulting increased 
concentration and enhanced multimarket contact did not have important consequences for 
airfares in Chinese city-pair markets. The presence of Hainan Airlines appears to have played 
an important role in suppressing the airfares charged by China Eastern and China Southern.  
 




Market power has been extensively studied in many industries and countries. 
However, studies of the market power that is created directly by mergers, or the actual 
effects of mergers, are relatively few in number. This is also the case for the airline 
industry, especially for the wave of airline mergers that has occurred since the late 
1990s, including China‘s 2002 airline consolidations. Unlike most mergers in 
developed countries, which are assessed and their effects estimated by antitrust 
authorities before being granted antitrust immunity, the airline mergers in China‘s 
airline industry in 2002 faced no antitrust challenges.
1
 This provides researchers with 
a good opportunity to study the potential market power issues in this market.  
Price-concentration studies and multimarket contact studies in the airline industry 
provide a methodology to assess market power indirectly, given that concentration 
and multimarket contact are the two main structural market legacies produced by an 
airline merger. Concentration has traditionally been a concern for public policy, while 
multimarket contact has been suggested by some academics to be a concern, although 
not much attention has been paid to this variable by antitrust authorities (Scott 1993, 
2001).  
The empirical studies to date of the effects of both concentration and multimarket 
contact have produced mixed results in the airline industry, making it hard to develop 
effective antitrust policy recommendations. This situation has also been complicated 
by the controversial interpretation of the effects of concentration.  Under these 
circumstances, therefore, it is wise to focus on the factors that can substantially 
restrict the carriers that enjoy dominant status at an airport or in a given market from 
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 After being discussed for more than ten years, China‘s first antitrust law was passed in 2007 and 
became effective on 1 August 2008. 
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exercising market power. The presence of low-cost carriers has been proved to have 
this effect and deserves attention. In this study, concentration variables are found not 
to have made substantial contributions to airfare levels. We also dismiss the 
importance of multimarket contact after China‘s airline mergers. Therefore, we 
conclude that the airline industry in China could be treated with a relatively lenient 
antitrust policy in the presence of low cost carriers, or in the presence of aggressive 
rival airlines.  
The next section will provide a brief background to China‘s airline mergers. 
Section three reviews the relevant literature. Section four contains the methodology 
and a description of the unique data set that was developed for this study. The results 
are analysed in section five. The final section summarises the research and concludes 
with some implications for Chinese competition policy. 
2. Background  
Before 1997, both the regional and trunk airlines in China were tightly regulated by 
the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) in every aspect of air services 
provision, including market entry, route entry, flight frequency, and pricing. The year 
1997 marked the start of deregulation, privatisation, and consolidation for China‘s 
airline industry (Zhang and Round 2008). Since then China‘s airlines have 
experienced a period of unexpected shocks from both home and abroad; intense 
competition has occurred between domestic carriers; increased challenges have 
emerged from aggressive international airlines; further deregulation demands have 
come from foreign governments; and a worldwide trend towards airline alliances has 
grown. Profits for China‘s airlines were no longer guaranteed, and profit fluctuations 
were unavoidable. For example, the airfare relaxation in 1997 immediately led to 
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repeated price wars in the domestic markets and resulted in a heavy loss of 3.5 billion 
Chinese yuan for the whole industry in 1998 (International Finance News 2003). 
Not happy to see this result, CAAC issued several notices from 1998 to 2001 to 
prohibit deeper discounts being offered by airlines (for example, discounts were not 
allowed to be deeper than 20%).  However, these attempts to regain control over 
airfares achieved little success, largely due to the lack of effective enforcement of 
these notices. Strong voices opposing price re-regulation also came from consumers 
who had benefited from price competition, and also from the airlines, which were 
reluctant to be deprived of their new-found pricing freedoms.
2
  
China‘s airline mergers were then proposed. CAAC hoped that re-grouping the 
state-owned airlines (although most of them had been partly privatised and publicly 
listed) would reduce what it regarded as unnecessary competition. The mergers were 
consummated on 11 October 2002, resulting in three major airline groups (Air China, 
China Southern, and China Eastern), with a few remaining independent airlines.  
3. Literature review 
The salient features of China‘s airline industry in the post-merger period are greatly 
increased airport and route concentration, and enhanced multimarket contact among 
the big three airlines. Several case studies have focused on mergers in the airline 
industry following the 1980s merger waves in the U.S., including GAO (1988), 
Borenstein (1990), Werden et al. (1991), Kim and Signal (1993), and Morrison (1996). 
The results of their findings are mixed. Generally, in most cases the concentration 
created by mergers in both routes and airports is positively associated with airfares, 
but its impact is not always as systematic and consistent as expected, and there is 
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 The government has had little influence on pricing since 2001, when the ‗revenue pooling scheme‘ 
collapsed.  For the role played by CAAC and a detailed discussion of other competition issues in 
China‘s airline market, see Zhang and Round (2008). 
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evidence that significant anti-competitive effects may not follow. Early literature 
examining the effects of airport dominance such as Borenstein (1989), Morrison and 
Winston (1989), Berry (1990), and GAO (1990) reported a positive relationship 
between airport dominance and airfares. However, later studies suggested that such 
effects might have been overstated in the absence of controlling for many other 
factors that affect fares (Morrison and Winston 1995; Tretheway and Kincaid 2005).  
The effect of route concentration on airfares is ambiguous. In Evans and Kessides 
(1993) and Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005), the impact of airport market share is 
positive and significant, while route market shares have no effect on airfares after 
controlling for the effects of scarce facilities and other sunk costs. Some other authors 
point to a positive relationship between airfares and route concentration when 
measured by market share (for example, Fischer and Kamerschen 2003). However, 
Fischer and Kamerschen pointed out that the sign for the route Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI) on airfares is theoretically ambiguous. They found a negative and 
significant effect of route HHI on yields.  
The lack of a clear relationship between price and concentration has led to a shift 
in focus to other factors that can be clearly observed and measured and that can 
consistently and significantly constrain the exercise of market power in spite of 
concentration. Tretheway and Kincaid (2005) claimed that the presence of low-cost 
carriers could have such an effect, which had been confirmed by numerous empirical 
studies including Bennett and Craun (1993), Dresner et al. (1996), Morrison (2001) 
and Vowles (2000, 2006).  
The concept of multimarket contact, a measure of the extent to which the same 
firms compete in multiple markets, can be traced to Corwin Edwards (1955). 
Multimarket contacts give the firms familiarity with the strategies of their rivals and 
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facilitate their tacit coordination and mutual understanding (Bernheim and Whinston 
1990; Scott 1993; Baum and Korn 1996). There have been a few studies on 
multimarket contact in airline markets, but they provide mixed results. Evans and 
Kessides (1994) reported the existence of a positive relationship between fares and 
multimarket contact. Singal (1996), Baum and Korn (1996), and Gimeno and Woo 
(1996) endorsed the mutual forbearance hypothesis as being relevant to the airline 
industry. However, some other studies such as Sandler (1988) conclude that higher 
multimarket contact leads to greater competition in markets. Morrison and Winston 
(1996) found that multimarket contact was positively correlated with the occurrence 
of price wars. 
Clearly, the effect of multimarket contact is an issue for empirical determination on 
a case-by-case basis. We will revisit this issue for China‘s airline markets, where there 
have been essentially no antitrust laws to oversee their conduct. 
4. Model specification and data 
Morrison and Winston (1995) claim that beginning with Bailey and Panzar (1981), a 
useful analytical tool has been developed to address the effects of competition on 
fares: a fare equation. A large body of literature has employed fare equations to 
examine pricing determinants, with many different purposes in mind. For example, 
research has variously focused on the effects of concentration (Borenstein 1989, 1992; 
Kim and Singal 1993; Leahy 1994); the effects of airline hub-and-spoke networks 
(Brueckner et al. 1992); the effects of the presence of low-cost carriers (Strassmann 
1990; Vowles 2000); and the effects of airline alliances (Park and Zhang 2000; 
Brueckner and Whalen 2000; Brueckner 2003). 
 These studies are actually conducted within the framework established by 
Bresnahan (1989), where a price equation is estimated without knowing actual cost 
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information. This information is instead inferred from cross-sectional variations in 
prices and product attributes. However, the potential endogeneity of some of the 
independent variables is inherent in this approach. Factors such as the number of 
passengers, market shares, and concentration ratios may be associated with the 




 In this paper a reduced form price regression model will be estimated to find the 
effects of concentration and multimarket contact on airfares, with the purpose of 
assessing the effects of the 2002 airline mergers.  
4.1. Dependent Variable 
One-way airfares adjusted for inflation are used in our pricing models, a practice 
followed by many other researchers (Borenstein 1989; Evans and Kessides 1994; Park 
and Zhang 2000). The fare data sets for this study come from two Chinese airlines: 
China Southern (CZ) and China Eastern (MU). The raw data include the number of 
passengers carried by each airline, and the one-way average airfares (or revenue) 
charged by each of them on a given route linking two domestic cities for a given 
month from January 2002 through December 2004. As China‘s airline consolidations 
were consummated in October 2002, the data set contains a 10-month period before 
the mergers and a 26-month period after the mergers. The monthly average airfare 
does not include airport taxes as this amount does not constitute any part of the 
revenue of the airlines, nor any other type of taxes. Note that average revenue per 
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 In many instances, it is difficult to identify a demand equation without sufficient data, or 
sometimes it is hard to distinguish demand functions from supply functions. Therefore, reduced form 
estimation is popular, compared with structural models (Baker and Rubinfeld 1999). Also, as noted by 





passenger is calculated as the monthly average on a given route of a single carrier, and 
hence is not the average revenue for an individual flight.  
However, data for some routes were not complete, either because of suspension of 
air services on these routes, or because of incomplete data collection by the airlines. If 
the total service interruption time length, or the number of periods with missing data 
on a route, was more than 12 of the 36 periods, it was dropped from our analysis. 
After screening, the final data set consisted of 113 markets for China Eastern and 76 
for China Southern. As Chinese domestic airlines only report one-way revenue and 
traffic statistics, in our analysis each direction on the same route will each be treated 
as a separate market.
4
 This can be justified by the fact that pricing decisions were 
usually delegated to the local sales offices that understood local markets and could 
closely monitor and match rivals‘ prices. All the routes are non-stop routes. Also it 
should be noted that during 2002-2004 Chinese airlines had not designed transfer 
programs to attract connecting passengers, and so the revenue and traffic information 
in our data are for local passengers.  
4.2. Independent Variables 
  Route HHI 
Most researchers argue that the ideal measure of route market share is the share of 
all local origin-to-destination passengers for the observed carrier in a given market 
(see Borenstein 1989 and Fischer and Kamerschen 2003). However, some studies 
have found that using either the number of flights or the number of passengers in a 
market as a basis for market concentration calculation generates similar results (see 
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 Unfortunately, because the relevant carriers do not report round-trip statistics, we are unable to 
combine meaningful data for round-trip markets. Although only some of the markets are two halves of 
round trips, correlation in error terms might arise. The use of the GMM estimation technique can 
accommodate this problem.   
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Bailey et al. 1985; Borenstein 1991; Borenstein and Rose 1994; and Stavins 1996). 
Owing to the unavailability of all of the traffic data for the two airlines, instead of 
using the passengers carried on each route, route market share was calculated using 
the available seat numbers (we checked the Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers, 
issued by the CAAC Chinese Air Carrier Timetable Press every March and October, 
for the frequency of each airline and the type of aircraft used for each flight). This 
method was also used by Lijesen et al. (2004).
5
 
     Based on the calculated market shares, the HHI for each route level can be 
computed accordingly. The annual average HHI was used as it can better reflect the 
interaction between carriers than the semi-annual HHI. The endogeneity problem has 
long been recognised as being associated with the regression of price on 
concentration. Given that we use an input measure of concentration (capacity) instead 
of an output measure (sales or number of passengers carried), and the capacity has 
been predetermined before a pricing schedule is put into effect, the endogeneity 
problem has been mitigated.
6
 
Busy Airport Dummy 
A dummy variable is specified for the top 10 cities (in terms of the number of 
passengers handled in 2004, according to data provided in China Civil Aviation 
Statistics 2005) from which flights depart, in order to capture the buyer effect on 
prices. The buying power of a small number of travel agents in large cities is 
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Our interviews with sales managers of the two airlines in China also suggested that the number of 
seats available on each airline should reflect their share of the market. In fact, load factor is regarded as 
an important performance indicator, and as such is a priority goal for each airline. Whenever there is a 
significant difference in load factors, a price war is most likely to occur to bridge the difference. 
6
 Greene (2003, p. 382) notes that predetermined variables in a model ―can be treated, at least 
asymptotically, as if they were exogenous in the sense that consistent estimates can be obtained when 
they appear as regressors.‖  
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generally strong, and this power could upset any price-fixing agreements among the 
airlines. This dummy variable may also reflect economic scarcity. For example, these 
airports are usually congested in terms of take-off and landing slots and the use of 
airport facilities, and therefore a fare premium may arise, but not necessarily imply 
market power per se (Levine 1987; Tretheway and Kincaid 2005). Price wars have 
been found to be less likely to occur in the markets associated with busy airports 
(Morrison and Winston 1996). Therefore, caution should be taken in interpreting the 
busy airport dummy because of the multiple effects that it might capture.  
Hub-to-Hub Market Dummy Variable 
Hub-to-hub markets are those where an airline has control over some of the airport 
facilities at both terminal airports on a particular route: where the two airports are the 
airline‘s primary or secondary hubs.7 An airline may share a hub with other airlines. 
For example, after acquiring Wuhan Airlines, China Eastern has Wuhan as one of its 
secondary hubs, but Wuhan Airport is also a secondary hub for China Southern. An 
airline does not necessarily have a dominant status at its hub airport in terms of 
market share, but will be a strong competitor for other airlines in markets out of this 
airport. We define any market linking an airline‘s primary or secondary hubs as a hub-
to-hub market. Generally, prices in hub-to-hub markets are likely to be higher, owing 
either to unilateral effects or to coordinated effects, but this may not always be the 
case given that efficiency gains may also be associated with these markets. 
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 For example, after the mergers, China Eastern Group‘s primary and secondary hubs included 
Shanghai, Jinan, Nanchang, Taiyuan, Hefei, Ningbo, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xi‘an, and Kunming 
(source: China Eastern‘s website, available at www.ce-air.com). The China Southern group operated 
the following primary and secondary hubs: Guangzhou, Urumqi, Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun, 
Dalian, Shenzhen, Haikou, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanning, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and 
Guiyang (source: China Southern‘s website, available at www.cs-air.com). 
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Multimarket Contact  
No widely accepted variable has been developed for measuring multimarket 
contact. Authors have developed their own formulae to take certain considerations 
into account. In general, methods have been based on two basic types of 
measurement: count measures and probabilistic measures. Singal (1996) has justified 
the use of the count measure in airline research. Following Heggestad and Rhoades 
(1978) and other contributions to the multimarket contact literature (Evans and 
Kessides 1994; Jans and Rosenbaum 1997; De Bonis and Ferrando 2000), a contact 
matrix was constructed to measure how many times an airline meets other airlines for 
each of the sample routes in each period of analysis. The method for the construction 
of this variable is a reproduction of the one used in many previous articles in the 




Evans and Kessides (1994) acknowledge that some routes are more important than 
other routes for an airline because they may generate more revenue or profits, and so 
they incorporate into the multimarket measure the revenue received from the route as 
a percentage of the airline‘s total revenue. Singal (1996) constructed a more 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 1 for a brief description. To simply illustrate the method of calculation, consider a 
market in which three airlines A, B, and C operate. If we assume that A meets B 50 times in other 
markets and meets C 40 times, while B meets C 10 times in all of the sample markets, then the contact 
matrix is: 
Airline A B C 
A – 50 40 
B 50 – 10 
C 40 10 – 
The total number of market meetings for the three airlines is 50 + 40 + 10 = 100. The number of 
possible pairings of airlines in this market is 3*(3–2)/2 = 3. Therefore, the average market contact for 




complicated measure of market contact by considering the number of carriers, the size 
of the route and the magnitude of the presence of competing firms, as well as their 
relative market shares. In our study, the basic count measure without incorporating 
any weights such as market share is preferred, as concentration variables have been 
separately included in the reduced form equation. The domestic timetables mentioned 
above were used to check the number of times the airlines met each other on each 
route for each time period. 
Distance 
Distance is the major variable that affects costs. It is measured by the non-stop 
mileage (stage length) between departure and arrival cities. If the airfare rather than 
the yield is used as the dependent variable, price should be expected to rise with 
distance. The stage length can be found in China Civil Aviation Statistics (2004). 
The Presence of an Aggressive Carrier 
China had no low cost carriers until 2005. However, Hainan Airlines was 
established in January 1993 and started operations on 2 May 1993. Its emergence is 
believed to have had the effect of lowering airfares. With the aim of becoming a 
national trunk airline, Hainan has taken every opportunity since then to expand.  
After taking over Chang‘an Airline in Xian and Shanxi Airline in Taiyuan in 2001, 
Hainan was able to develop bases in northwestern cities, which were part of China 
Northwest‘s and later China Eastern‘s territory after the two airlines merged. At the 
same time, Hainan acquired the Beijing- and Tianjin-based Xinhua Airlines, helping it 
to gain access to Beijing Airport, and the adjacent Tianjing Airport. In the mid-1990s, 
Hainan deployed several aircraft at Ningbo, a neighbouring city to Shanghai, to 
establish a home base in the East China area.  
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Thus, a series of takeovers has allowed Hainan to fly to and from Hainan Island in 
the South, Xian and Taiyuan in the northwest, Beijing and Tianjing in the north, and 
Ningbo in the east, making it the fourth largest airline in China by the end of 2002, in 
terms of destinations serviced and traffic carried. During the implementation of its 
expansion strategy, price competition was an effective and frequently-used means of 
acquiring market share, and therefore the presence of Hainan on a route may have had 
a similar effect to that of a low cost carrier by creating pressure on the major carriers, 
and thus a dummy variable indicating the presence of Hainan Airlines is included as 
an indicator of price competition whenever a city-pair is served by this airline. 
Tourism Market Variable 
Traditionally, Guilin, Haikou, Sanya, Zhangjiajie, Huangshan, Hangzhou, and 
Wuyishan have been labelled as tourism cities because their economic growth is 
heavily dependent on the tourism industry.
9
 Tourists tend to have a more elastic 
demand than do business travellers; consequently, low fares are expected for the 
markets in and out of these cities owing to the high ratio of leisure to business 
passengers. 
Number of Passengers 
The interpretation of the impact of passenger numbers is controversial. Some 
researchers think that this variable measures the returns to traffic density, and 
therefore an increase in output should lead to a decrease in prices due to the use of 
larger, more cost-efficient aircraft (Brueckner et al. 1992; Brueckner and Spiller 1994; 
Lee and Luengo-Prado 2005). Graham et al. (1983) predicted a negative sign for this 
variable on airfares, but their result showed an insignificant positive coefficient. 
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 Some other cities may also have important sightseeing spots, like Xi‘an, but flights to these cities may 
also involve a high percentage of business passengers as they are also significant commercial cities. 
Consequently, we chose not to include them as tourist cities. 
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Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) also argued that a larger number of passengers would 
lead to increases in load factors and therefore unit costs per passenger should decrease.  
In contrast, based on a profit-maximising cost equation, Dresner and Tretheway 
(1992) argued that higher output levels should lead to a higher marginal cost curve if 
the carriers were operating at the range where the marginal cost curve trended 
upwards. Windle and Dresner (1995) argued that the number of passengers is both a 
demand-side and a cost-side variable. On the demand side, an increase in the number 
of passengers implies a rightward shift of the demand curve and should result in 
higher prices, ceteris paribus. On the cost side, higher passenger density brings about 
cost economies and lower prices. Taking these possibilities together, the net effect of 
passengers on price cannot be pre-determined. 
This variable is also associated with the endogeneity problem owing to the fact that 
fluctuations in the dependent variable can be expected to affect the passenger numbers 
variable.  Following the literature we could use population and disposable income as 
instruments for handling this problem (see Dresner and Tretheway 1992 and Fischer 
and Kamerschen 2003). However, many of the previous studies deal only with cross-
section data. For our panel data study, in addition to the time-constant variables, it is 
important to find at least one instrument that is time varying for the passenger 
numbers variable.
10
 The number of carriers operating in a market could serve as an 
instrumental variable. As with the concentration variable, they are predetermined and 
so are not directly linked to a particular airline‘s price, and they can thus be assumed 
not to be correlated with the error term.  
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 Busse (2002) uses departures, or the number of planes that leave the ground, as the instrument for the 
number of passengers variable, in that departures reflect the airlines‘ capacity and their forecasts of 
demand. However, some researchers contend that frequency is endogenous.  
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The sources and measurement of the suggested instrumental variables for the 
number of passengers are as follows: The population of China‘s cities comes from 
China City Statistics Yearbook (2004). Following Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and 
Brueckner and Whalen (2000), the geometric mean (in thousands) of the population 
for both route endpoint cities is used to measure the market‘s ―population potential‖, 
which is assumed to influence demand. Instead of using disposable income as an 
instrument, GDP per capita is preferred. Given the high percentage of business 
passengers on many of China‘s domestic routes, GDP per capita is more appropriate 
to reflect the business activities of a city. The GDP per capita data also come from the 
China City Statistics Yearbook (2004). Following the traditional approaches in the 
literature, the geometric mean of GDP per capita of route endpoints is used to reflect 
the demand for air travel. The time-varying instrument - number of carriers - is 
obtained from the airline timetables. 
Year, Quarter and SARS Period Dummy Variables 
To capture the fare trend from year to year, a year dummy variable for each of 
2003 and 2004 is included in the regression model. Quarterly dummy variables are 
also included, with the first quarter being the benchmark season. Prices in the SARS 
period (May and June 2003) were extremely high because all businesses and 
individuals cancelled unnecessary travel. The airlines realised that demand was almost 
perfectly inelastic during this period, and charged high prices accordingly. To control 
for this unusual period, a SARS dummy variable is included. 
The definition of all the variables, their abbreviations, and the data sources are 





5. Estimation and Discussion 
The descriptive statistics for China Eastern and for China Southern are given in 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively. The regression results are reported in Table 3. 
It is common for a deviation from homoskedastic errors to occur in the context of 
panel data as a result of the error variances specific to the cross-sectional unit. This 
has been confirmed by conducting two tests suggested by Greene (2003) and 
Wooldridge (2002).
11 
In the presence of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and 
endogeneity, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) has been widely used and 
recommended by econometricians (see Wooldridge 2002 and Baum et al. 2003). The 
GMM method that was introduced by Hansen (1982) makes use of the orthogonality 
conditions, or instruments, in an optimal way in cases where there are more 
instruments than endogenous variables, to allow for efficient estimation in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form. We report the estimation results 
using the GMM approach separately for China Eastern and for China Southern, 
respectively, as a Chow test suggests that the coefficients in the two regressions using 
the two airlines‘ data are significantly different.   
The use of instrumental variables comes with a cost—the loss of efficiency in the 
IV estimator compared to its OLS counterpart. It is necessary to test whether the 
endogeneity problem exists and whether these instruments are needed. The Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity can be performed in Stata by producing 
theC statistic, from which we can judge whether instrumental variable techniques are 
needed. This test is chosen for its validity when robust standard errors are used. The C  
test statistics are reported in the last row of Table 3. They are all significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that instrumental variable techniques should be used. 
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 The user-written command in Stata ―xttest3‖ and ―xtserial‖ can perform these tasks. 
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5.1. Concentration Variables  
Most of the route HHI indexes in 2002 exceeded 4500 in the post-merger period, 
which falls into the highly concentrated market category, according to the US Merger 
Guidelines. Most of the increases in the route HHI due to the mergers involving China 
Southern were well beyond 100 points, which would raise ―significant competitive 
concerns‖ under the Guidelines. However, although the route HHI variable has a 
positive and significant sign for both China Eastern and China Southern at the 1% and 
10% levels respectively, an increase in airport HHI by 100 points will result in about 
one Chinese yuan in airfares for both airlines, if all other variables are held constant. 
This result seems to be consistent with the findings of Evans and Kessides (1993): 
Route-level dominance does not confer much market power, if any, on the airlines. 
The busy airport dummy and the hub-to-hub market dummy do not necessarily 
represent concentrated markets. They might reflect multiple effects. For example, the 
busy airport dummy denoting the top 10 busiest cities from which the flights depart, 
might reflect the effects of both the buying power of big travel agents and economic 
scarcity. As many airlines operate from these airports, making price collusion more 
difficult, a significant positive impact on airfares might be more likely to imply the 
economic scarcity effect rather than the market power effect. The busy airport 
coefficient is significantly positive for China Eastern only, showing that the economic 
scarcity effect dominated the buying power effect and provided these busy airports 
with an airfare premium. As most of the busiest airports have approached their full 
capacity, hindering an increase in flight frequencies and new entry, it is not surprising 
to see this price premium. 
Hub-to-hub markets, reflecting the control of airport resources by a carrier at both 
terminal airports of a particular route, on average exhibited negative effects on 
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airfares. From our econometric results, with other factors being controlled for, it 
appears that hub-to-hub markets themselves did not necessarily lead to higher prices 
on average than do non-hub-to-hub markets. They appear not to present a problem for 
competition. This is in contrast to Vowles (2006), who found that markets in the US 
with two endpoints being dominated by the same airline exhibited consistently higher 
fares. The failure by Vowles to control for factors such as busy airports may, 
however, explain this difference. 
The presence of Hainan Airlines had the clear effect of suppressing the airfares 
charged by China Eastern, and especially by China Southern. The airfares on average 
are estimated to be lower by 33 yuan for China Eastern and 141 yuan for China 
Southern. The greater influence on China Southern‘s pricing might come from the fact 
that Hainan Airline‘s initial base, Hainan province, is also a base for China Southern‘s 
Hainan branch, and Hainan province is close to China Southern‘s primary hubbing 
airport, Guangzhou. Although Hainan is not a low cost carrier, it does appear to have 
constrained prices in the markets in which it operated. 
A natural question should now be asked: why does concentration (as measured by 
the route HHI) appear not to have mattered in China‘s airline markets? Although the 
big airlines have tried to enforce their dominant status in their primary hubs (Beijing 
for Air China, Shanghai for China Eastern and Guangzhou for China Southern), and 
the mergers indeed gave them opportunities to strengthen their dominant status, these 
positions have been constantly under threat.  
Since 2002, the management rights of almost all of China‘s airports have been 
transferred to provincial governments, except for the Beijing Capital and Tibetan 
airports. Most of these airports were heavily in debt and were subsidised by the 
central government. After the transfer, the financing burden fell on the provincial 
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governments. Apart from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, more than 90% of 
airports had suffered losses for many years because their only revenue came from 
charging the airlines for their use of the airports. The landing fees as well as other 
service fees are regulated by CAAC, and these usually cover only the variable costs of 
provision. Unlike the big three airports, which can also make revenue from 
concessionary services such as retail shops, advertising, and office rental, because 
they handle tens of millions of passengers each year, most of the provincial airports 
have long been underused, thereby requiring subsidies in order to survive. For most of 
them, it has been, and will be, very hard to avoid losses in the foreseeable future. 
In addition, almost all of China‘s airports are largely independent of the airlines. 
The current Regulation on Domestic Investment in the Civil Aviation Industry
12
 does 
not allow an airline to have more than a 25% stake in an airport. For every airport in 
China, attracting more airlines to operate to and from it implies an increase in revenue 
if its capacity can be fully utilised. Therefore, the airports welcome new airlines or 
encourage existing airlines to increase their frequencies. With the support of the 
Beijing Airport authority, China Southern has exclusively owned and operated 
Terminal One at Beijing Airport since September 2004. The intention for the 
cooperation between Beijing Airport and China Southern might have begun much 
earlier than 2004. This clearly sent a signal to Air China, the airline based at this 
airport, that the new firm sought to take market share away from it. 
At the same time, Hainan Airlines and Shenzhen Airlines started to covet China 
Southern‘s base airport at Guangzhou. Shenzhen Airlines, a local airline based in 
Shenzhen, 150 kilometres from Guangzhou, had long planned to operate more flights 
from Guangzhou and eventually gained access rights in early 2005 with the 
                                                 
12
See CAAC regulation series number CCAR-209.  
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establishment of the subsidiary Shenzhen Airlines Guangzhou Branch (He 2005). He 
also reported that Hainan Airlines would invest US$200 million in the construction of 
its Guangzhou base. The same report also mentioned that Shanghai Airlines, China 
Eastern, and Air China were negotiating with the Guangzhou Airport authorities for 
the construction of facilities to accommodate more flights to and from Guangzhou. 
Clearly, the open attitude of the major airports impedes the development of 
monopoly power by the airlines based in these airports. The strategy of encroachment 
on a rival‘s primary base airport seems to have deterred all the airlines from charging 
higher airfares on most routes to and from their primary hubs, and thus consumers 
have enjoyed low airfares, even after the 2002 mergers. 
5.2. Effects of Multimarket Contact on Airfares 
Multimarket contact had a negative and significant effect on airfares for China 
Southern, but the effect on China Eastern‘s was not statistically significant.13 This 
result appears to be at odds with the traditional forbearance hypothesis. 
The absence of antitrust laws in China means that collusive behaviour by airlines 
to date has faced no threat of prosecution, as long as airfares are not more than the 
published full fares. Airfare collusion in China is not a secret and has been widely 
reported (Zhang and Round 2008). However, the results in this study suggest that 
there has been no systematic and successful price fixing across markets. This is 
consistent with casual observation. In essence, because of the strong competition in 
China‘s airline markets, explicit price-fixing agreements generally could not be 
expected to last long, let alone any implicit collusion implied by mutual forbearance. 
                                                 
13
 However, when we included an interaction term hupresence*mnc in the reduced-form regression 
model with China Eastern‘s data sample, the interaction term is negative and significant at 10%, 
suggesting stronger competition when Hainan Airlines is present.  
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Also as pricing power has been largely delegated to local sales managers (especially 
in the three biggest cities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou), who are usually in 
charge of a number of routes out of their city, and it is their responsibility to maximise 
the revenue on these routes. The narrow focus on a small number of routes implies 
that mutual forbearance or implicit collusion in a broader geographic market is not 
possible. 
5.3. Effects of Other Variables 
We now briefly discuss some of the other variables in our reduced form regression 
model. After controlling for other factors, the year dummies reveal a strong and 
highly significant declining trend in airfares for both airlines. Of course, the year 
dummy effects will have incorporated some merger effects that could not be captured 
by other variables such as concentration and multimarket contact, but it seems that for 
the mergers involving China Eastern and China Southern, any market power gained 
from them has not been seriously abused by these airlines during the period 2002-
2004.  
The significant SARS dummy produced a positive shock to airfare pricing, as 
expected. The signs of the coefficient for the demand variable, the number of 
passengers, are not consistent for the two airlines. The effect of demand on China 
Southern‘s airfares is negatively significant at the 1% level while the effect on China 
Eastern‘s pricing is positive, although the coefficients are small in value. This 
ambiguity is not surprising. The literature discussed earlier suggested that the net 
effect of this variable on price is largely an empirical issue. The coefficients found in 
this study support this view. 
The influence of demand on prices can also be reflected by the sign of the quarterly 
dummy variables. For both airlines, the fourth quarter saw significantly lower fares 
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than the first quarter. Unlike Western countries, where Christmas travel may push up 
airfares, November and December in China are usually off-peak periods despite the 
long holiday in early October.  
The airfares in the typical tourism markets were substantially lower. This shows 
that where leisure passengers constitute a significant part of total passengers, airfares 
are much lower as a result of the airlines‘ recognition of the elastic demand of this 
group of consumers. Furthermore, many of these tourists are organised by large travel 
agents who have substantial bargaining power in acquiring bulk seats at cheaper fares, 
leading to the negative impact of the tourism route variable. 
6. Conclusions  
By estimating a reduced form regression for two leading Chinese airlines, we found 
that route concentration, while having a significant and positive impact, did not 
contribute in an economically meaningful way to airfares in China following the 
mergers in 2002. The small positive impact of route concentration on airfares 
indicates that increased concentration on a route might not be as detrimental to 
consumers as has commonly expected. In addition, in hub-to-hub markets, where 
carriers could command airport resources, evidence of a negative premium was found. 
Two main reasons can explain the unimportance of concentration: the threat from 
strong rival airlines, which constantly encroach on a rival‘s hubbing airports, and the 
emergence of Hainan Airlines, which adopted an aggressive expansionary strategy 
with little apparent desire to engage in price fixing with the other carriers. As a result, 
the detrimental effect of the airline mergers was minimised. 
The finding of a negative effect of multimarket contact on airfares for China 
Southern and an insignificant effect for China Eastern does not support the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis. Pricing locally instead of system-wide by the airlines‘ 
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headquarters perhaps precluded the use of tacit collusion strategies. It appears to be 
the practice globally that carriers tend to concentrate on a certain market or group of 
markets and determine prices according to conditions in these markets, rather than 
considering uniform or tacitly co-operative pricing across all markets. In this sense, 
there seems to be no need to give great weight to multimarket contact as a factor in 
assessing proposed airline mergers or airline alliances, at least in China. Together 
with the findings of the lesser importance of concentration in determining airfares, a 
relatively lenient antitrust policy might be justified when considering the Chinese 
airline industry, especially in the presence of low cost carriers, or in the continued 
presence of expansion-focused carriers like Hainan Airlines. 
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Appendix 1  The Construction of the Multimarket Contact Variable 
    
The method for the construction of this variable is almost the same as in the previous 
literature discussed in the text. 
   Assume that there are J routes and I airlines in the sample markets. Let the subscript 
i=1,…, I represent an airline, and j=1,…, J represent a route. Let Vij be equal to 1 if 



























lk, =1, 2, …, I . 
Off-diagonal elements kla measure the number of markets in which airline k and l 
meet, and diagonal elements measure the number of markets that each airline services. 
If there are fj airlines offering services on route j, then fj(fj-1)/2 enumerates the total 
number of possible pairings of firms on route j. 
   From the matrix, the average airline multimarket contact for route j can be 
constructed: 
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If the period subscript is added, the multimarket contactjt is the average contact 
between the airlines on route j in month t. 
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Appendix 2  Definition of key variables and data sources 
Variable Abbreviation Definition Data Source 
Dependent variables   
cpiprice Average one-way airfare for airline 
MU/CZ in a market 
China Eastern (MU) and China 
Southern (CZ) 
Independent variables   
routehhi Route Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
for a market 
Calculated by authors based on 
Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers 
(2002–2004) 
routeshare Market share of airline MU/CZ in a 
given market 
Calculated by authors based on 
Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers 
(2002–2004) 
mnc Average multimarket contact in a 
given market 
Calculated by authors based on 
Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers 
(2002–2004) 
hupresence A dummy indicating the presence of 
Hainan Airlines in a market 
Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers 
(2002–2004) 
distance One-way distance between the two 
endpoints of a market 
China Civil Aviation Statistics (2004) 
tourismroute Tourism route dummy  
busyapt Busiest 10 airports in China China Civil Aviation Statistics (2005) 
hubtohub Markets linking an airline‘s primary 
and secondary hubs 
Airlines‘ websites: www.cs-air.com 
and www.ce-air.com 
paxno Number of passengers carried by 
airline MU/CZ in a market 
China Eastern and China Southern 
sarsdummy SARS period dummy, taking the 
value of 1 for the periods of May–




y2003 A year dummy representing year 
2003 
 
y2004 A year dummy representing year 
2004 
 
Q2 A quarter dummy representing 
quarter two 
 
Q3 A quarter dummy representing 
quarter three 
 
Q4 A quarter dummy representing 
quarter four 
 
Instrumental    variables   
gemeanpopulation Geometric mean (in thousands) of 
the population for both route 
endpoint cities 
China City Statistics Yearbook 
(2004) 
gemeangdp Geometric mean of GDP per capita 
of both route endpoint cities 
China City Statistics Yearbook 
(2004) 
carrierno Number of carriers operating in a 
market 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for China Eastern 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cpiprice 3550 682.441 225.070 111.016 1976.359 
routehhi 4068 4659.478 1985.495 2209.705 10000 
busyapt 4068 0.566 0.496 0 1 
hubtohub 4068 0.124 0.330 0 1 
mnc 4068 36.517 24.779 0 115 
hupresence 4068 0.171 0.377 0 1 
distance 4068 1180.593 577.040 160 3649 
tourismroute 4068 0.212 0.409 0 1 
sarsdummy 4068 0.0556 0.229 0 1 
y2003 4068 0.333 0.471 0 1 
y2004 4068 0.333 0.471 0 1 
Q2 4068 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Q3 4068 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Q4 4068 0.250 0.433 0 1 
paxno 3661 6020.447 7371.054 26 71645 
gemeanpopulation 4068 5431.266 2566.661 807.402 13410.750 
gemeangdp 4068 34104.24 8917.485 16416.43 53461.83 











 Table 2 Descriptive statistics for China Southern 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cpiprice 2573 690.614 262.350 212.159 1963.184 
routehhi 2736 5688.862 2504.139 2531.979 10000 
busyapt 2736 0.618 0.486 0 1 
hubtohub 2736 0.211 0.408 0 1 
mnc 2736 41.154 31.549 0 115 
hupresence 2736 0.206 0.405 0 1 
distance 2736 1214.237 650.549 452 3836 
tourismroute 2736 0.263 0.440 0 1 
sarsdummy 2736 0.056 0.229 0 1 
y2003 2736 0.333 0.471 0 1 
y2004 2736 0.333 0.471 0 1 
Q2 2736 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Q3 2736 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Q4 2736 0.250 0.433 0 1 
paxno 2576 7408.702 7657.076 145 48744 
gemeanpopulation 2736 5258.334 2409.549 2022.870 11032.83 
gemeangdp 2736 34802.750 8451.169 16416.430 51436.950 














Table 3 Estimation results with GMM approach  
Variable 






routehhi 0.009*** 0.001 0.005* 0.002 
busyapt 19.077*** 6.399 -2.536 9.220 
hubtohub –23.992*** 8.989 -14.377* 8.423 
mnc 0.057 0.136 –0.384*** 0.141 
hupresence –33.484*** 8.009 –141.055*** 11.144 
distance 0.355*** 0.008 0.336*** 0.010 
tourismroute –130.5872*** 8.207 –86.017*** 8.226 
sarsdummy 99.409*** 13.642 138.011*** 22.498 
y2003 –58.533*** 7.982 –27.008*** 9.592 
y2004 –67.796*** 8.207 –50.685*** 9.342 
Q2 -3.29412 6.814 12.726 8.487 
Q3 –22.487*** 7.087 –7.150 9.122 
Q4 –46.984*** 6.842 –27.768*** 8.487 
paxno 0.006** 0.001 –0.008*** 0.001 
_cons 274.317*** 16.418 294.417*** 26.005 
Centred R
2
 0.758 0.784 
Uncentred R
2
 0.976 0.973 
Observations  3546 2573 
C statistic 32.623 42.220 
Note:  ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. 
*
Significant at 10%. 
 
